AV (Alternative Vote)

Single-winner ranked ballot. Voters rank candidates 1, 2, 3… Lowest-placed candidate eliminated each round, their votes transferred to next preference, until one candidate has >50% of remaining votes.

Used in Australian House of Representatives elections. Proposed for Westminster in the 2011 UK referendum — rejected 68% to 32% (low turnout, ~42%).

Disadvanages of AV

Not proportional

  • Still single-member constituencies, still winner-takes-all at the end
  • Can produce results as disproportionate as FPTP in practice
    • e.g. modelling of 2010 election under AV suggested broadly similar outcome to FPTP, just with a bigger Lib Dem bloc

Complexity

  • Harder to explain than a simple X in the box
  • Multiple counting rounds slow down declaration of results
  • 2011 referendum campaign relied heavily on “too complicated” messaging

Can still elect a candidate most voters ranked last

  • Depends on transfer patterns — a polarising candidate who is many voters’ first choice can still win despite being widely disliked
  • Contrast with STV where preferences are pooled across a whole quota rather than one seat

Exhausted ballots

  • Voters who don’t rank enough candidates can have their ballot “exhaust” before the final round if all their ranked candidates are eliminated
  • Effectively disenfranchises those voters in the deciding round

Advantages of AV

Majority winner in each seat

  • Ensures the winning candidate has support from >50% of those who expressed a valid preference, unlike FPTP’s plurality winners
    • e.g. Hendon 2024-style knife-edge pluralities avoided

Reduces tactical voting

  • Voters can rank a small-party favourite first without “wasting” their vote, since it transfers if eliminated
  • Reduces the “wasted vote” argument used against FPTP

Keeps constituency link

  • Retains single-member constituencies
  • Same Burkean trustee/accountability logic as FPTP, without the winner’s-bonus distortion

Discourages extremist candidates

  • Candidates need broad transferable appeal (second and third preferences), not just a concentrated core vote
  • Arguably strengthens the “prevention of extremist parties” advantage claimed for FPTP
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